Congressional Roll Call Voting Strategies: Application of a New Test to Minimum Wage Legislation by Krehbiel, Keith & Rivers, Douglas
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA. CALIFORNIA 91125 
CONGRESSIONAL ROLL CALL VOTING STRATEGIES: 
APPLICATION OF A NEW TEST TO MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION 
Keith Krehbiel and Douglas Rivers 
California Institute of Technology 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 585 
September 1985 
CONGRESSIONAL ROLL CALL VOTING STRATEGIES: 
APPLICATION OF A NEW TEST TO MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION 
Keith Krehbiel and Douglas Rivers 
INTRODUCTION 
Congressional roll call voting usually is interpreted as a 
mixture of the preferences of individual congressmen and the 
preferences of their constituents. Preferences of the legislator are 
typically measured by characteristics such as party and ADA ratings, 
while constituency interests are measured by economic characteristics 
of congressional districts or states. The degree to which each set of 
characteristics predicts roll call voting is then taken as evidence of 
the influence of constituency interests and legislator's ideology, 
respectively. Increasingly, political scientists (and economists who 
have also taken an interest in this topic) understand that such 
interpretations are problematic because they ignore the institutional 
context in which the behavior takes place. Use of characteristics of 
constituencies as measures of constituency preferences, for example, 
requires at least three strong assumptions: 
( 1) Constituency preferences on legislative proposals depend only 
upon the effects of such proposals on constituents' wealth ( i. e. ,  
constituents lack ideological preferences). 
(2) Congressmen respond only to the desires of the average or median 
voter (i.e. ,  constituencies are not composed of coalitions, 
contributors, or other groups that may influence the MC 
disproportionately) .  
( 3) Roll call votes are honest or "sincere" revelations of 
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legislators' preferences, whatever the source of such preferences 
(such as electoral incentives, personal ideology, etc.). 
Three classes of research illustrate the implicit reliance on 
assumption (3), which is the focus of this paper. The first includes 
the works of Jackson ( 1971, 1974), Kingdon ( 1973) and Ferejohn ( 1974) 
and addresses whether, how, and how strongly individual votes are 
affected by constituencies, parties, leaders, interest groups, staff, 
the president, and the media, Kingdon's more recent study ( 1977) 
synthesizes some earlier findings, while an emerging set of studies 
assesses the relative effects of economic self-interest versus 
ideology as predictors of roll call votes. ( See, for example, Kau and 
Rubin, 1979; Kalt, 1981; Kalt and Zupan, 1984; Silberman and Durden, 
1976; Pashigian 1982; Silberberg and Nelson, 1984; and Peltzman 1984). 
A second, older, but continuing line of research focuses on dimensions 
of conflict and voting alignments in Congress. MacRae ( 1958) 
introduced this field, and its continuing interest to political 
scientists is evident in Clausen ( 1973), Sinclair ( 1977), Asher and 
Weisberg ( 1978), Schneider ( 1979), Smith ( 1981), and Poole ( 1981). 
Finally, a third class of research addresses the use of available 
data. MacRae ( 1965) designed a technique for using roll call votes to 
identify issues and factions, and Morrison ( 1972) and Clausen and Van 
Horn ( 1977) continued the study of how to make the best use of voting 
data. Weisberg ( 197 8) discusses various criteria for evaluating 
models that predict congressional votes . And most recently, Carson 
and Oppenheimer ( 1984) have questioned applications of interest group 
ratings to answer the question of economic self-interest versus 
ideology. 
The range of issues addressed in such literature is 
impressive, but the more fundamental question represented by 
assumption (3) is largely ignored. When, and to what degree, do roll 
call votes unambiguously reflect the preferences of political actors? 
This question has not been completely overlooked (see Riker, 1958; 
Bjurulf and Niemi, 1978; Enelow and Kochler, 1980; Enelow, 1981; and 
Denzau, Riker and Shepsle, 1985) , but the exceptions face a common 
problem: to assess the voting strategies of MCs one needs to know 
MCs' preferences, Traditionally this need is met either by seeking 
guidance of interest group ratings (e .g. ADA scores ) ,  or by making 
informed but necessarily ad hoc case-by-case assertions about members' 
true preferences. The former approach is of course dubious inasmuch 
as the assumption of honest revelation is imbedded in interest group 
ratings, too, while the latter precludes systematic empirical study of 
roll call voting strategies. 
In this paper we introduce and employ a new and promising 
approach. Part 1 discusses the institutional context in which 
revelation of preferences might not be straightforward and shows how 
"agenda trees " in the contemporary House and Senate often can be 
represented as multi-stage "decision trees" that are more' tractable 
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theoretically. Part 2 introduces a random expected utility model 
which incorporates some natural econometric tests of sincere versus 
sophisticated voting, yet does not rely upon interest group ratings or 
assertions about members' preference orderings . Part 3 applies some 
of the new estimation techniques to Senate voting on minimum wage 
legislation in 1977. And part 4 offers some suggestions for further 
applications of random expected utility models to questions of 
legislative strategy in institutionally richer se ttings. 
l, THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF ROLL CALL VOTING 
Institutions such as the United States Congress are 
sufficiently complex to provide ample opportunities for members not 
only to behave in puzzling ways but also to benefit from such 
behavior. For example, if a member of Congress wants to initiate a 
policy, rarely is it in his best interest to propose legislation that 
enacts the policy in the precise manner that he most prefers (Enelow, 
1984) . More likely, his desire to get som� policy enacted is better 
served by reducing benefits or distributing them to a greater number 
of recipients (Arnold, 1979) . A similar but more frequent strategic 
choice of MCs is how to vote on legislation at various stages in the 
legislative process. The similarity is that MCs often may find it 
advantageous in the long run to vote against proposals (or parts of 
proposals ) they genuinely favor--a strategy formally characterizable 
as "sophisticated voting" (Farquharson, 1969) . Invariably, such 
opportunities to benefit from behavior that is ostensibly contrary to 
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one's wishes are attributable to concrete institutional features that 
determine how , when, and by whom preferences can be expressed, For 
roll call voting decisions the relevant institutional features are the 
rules governing the amendment process, 
While the complexity of the amendment process in Congress is 
undeniable, it can be translated into a tractable decision-theoretic 
problem. The translation requires knowledge of key institutional 
details and application of some basic theoretical tools. The tools we 
adopt for describing and studying the details of the amendment process 
are amendment trees and decision trees (or formal agendas) .  The 
amendment tree can be thought of as a diagram that represents the 
possibilities for modifying legislation under normal congressional 
procedures, while the decision tree is a representation of the 
actualities of a particular legislative situation. As it turns out we 
do not need to worry about all such subtleties for the test presented 
in this paper. Nevertheless we introduce them as a guide for future 
applications . 
For expository purposes it is sufficient to focus on the 
normal procedure in the House when it acts as Committee of the Whole 
under its normal germaneness rule (Rule XVI, clause 7, section 794) . 
( This situation is not fundamentally different from that of the 
Senate . The House typically votes on a special rule that specifies 
the conditions of debate and amendment (see Bach, 1981 ) while the 
Senate reaches such agreement more informally via unanimous consent 
(Keith, 1977) . Also, the Senate's amendment tree contains more 
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branches and generally constrains members less.) 
The House usually considers bills section by section, as shown 
in Figure 1, Each section of the bill may receive modifications in 
the form of amendments, substitutes to amendments, amendments to 
amendments, and amendments to substitutes (but not amendments to 
amendments to amendments, which, being modifications "to the third 
degree" are prohibited by rule XIX, section 823 ) .  These motions are 
then voted on in an established order: first the amendment to the 
amendment (to perfect the amendment ) ,  then the amendment to the 
substitute (to perfect the substitute) ,  then the substitute (possibly 
as amended ) ,  and then the first degree amendment (possibly as amended 
or substituted ) .  After repeating this for all sections, members vote 
on final passage, This may take rather implicit forms such as a 
motion to strike the enacting clause, to table, or to recommit. 
Associated with any given amendment tree is a decision tree. 
Suppose that for the kth section of a bill, all four of the motions in 
Figure 1 are offered. The theoretical representation of that fully 
grown section of the amendment tree is the decision tree (of formal 
agenda) in Figure 2, where: 
x1 is the unamended kth section of the bill 
X2 is the amendment ( first degree) to X1 
X
3 is the substitute amendment ( first degree) for x2 
X
4 is �e (second degree) amendment to �e amendment, 
X2 
X
5 is �e (second degree) amendment to the substitute, x3• 
• 
FIGURE 1 
AMENDMENT TREE UNDER NORMAL 
HOUSE RULES 
Section 1 
Section 2 
Amendment 
Amendment to 
the Amendment 
Section K 
Amendment to 
the Substitute 
Substitute 
Amendment 
Section n 
Degree 
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Motion: 
1 
2 
2 
1 
Order of 
Voting 
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Section): 
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FIGURE 2 DEcrsro:1 T.�EE FOR SECTJon K 01' Picune 1 
Amendment to the 
Amendment 
Amendment to the 
Substitute 
Substitute (possibly as amended) 
Amendment (possibly as amended or substituted) 
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The four levels of the tree denote four votes taken on the respective 
motions. Both theory and practice suggest that such agendas provide 
frequent incentives to vote contrary to what myopic or "sincere" 
preferences would dictate. Additionally, decision trees provide 
structure useful for conducting empirical tests, as we demonstrate for 
a simpler case later in the paper. But there are a few additional 
institutional features and associated caveats to consider prior to 
testing hypotheses on voting strategies. 
First, notice that the votes on the "substitute" and the 
"amendment" ( in stages 3 and 4 respectively) are not necessarily votes 
on the substance originally associated with such motions. Rather, the 
meaning of the terms often depends upon how voting transpires, For 
example, the fourth stage is nominally a vote on the amendment. 
However of the eight possible votes that may occur, the original 
amendment,. x2, appears in only two. In al 1 other cases the actual 
vote is on the amendment as amended or as substituted (and similarly, 
the nominal substitute may have been amended in stage 2). As a 
practical matter then, when sifting through the Congressional Record 
or Congressional Quarterly to select votes, one must verify that the 
"vote of the Jones amendment" is not a vote on a substantially 
different amended version of the Jones amendment. 
Second, the theory of sophisticated voting pertains to 
settings in which agendas are fixed. But of course legislative 
strategy consists not only of voting on exogenously imposed agendas 
but also of constructing agendas. This is especially likely in the 
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House under an open rule and in the Senate in the absence of a 
unanimous consent agreement. For example, suppose vote is taken on an 
amendment to a substitute. Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the next 
decision will be a vote on the substitute (possibly as amended), but 
actually a member may be recognized to propose another amendment to 
the substitute. Figuratively, branches of the tree, once pruned, can 
instantly grow back. Although theoretically this feature destroys the 
ability of voters to engage in sophisticated voting, it does not 
necessarily preclude empirical analysis. Increasingly, the House 
Rules Committee writes modified closed rules that contain provisions 
which have the collective effect of making the amendment and decision 
trees well-known (Bach, 1981; Krehbiel, 1985) , and the use of complex 
unanimous consent agreements in the Senate can have the same effect. 
For analysis of voting strategies, then, it is advisable not only 
reconstruct the trees but also to study rules or UCAs to determine 
whether members had reasonable expectations about how the trees would 
evolve. 
Third, for the sophisticated voting hypothesis to be 
plausible, the agenda tree should not be too complex. Figure 2 shows 
four votes, but realize that this is for only one section of the bill. 
Suppose there were five sections to the bill and for each section the 
amendment tree were filled once and then voted on. Theoretically, a 
prediction under sophisticated voting could be obtained, But as a 
practical matter it is difficult to sustain the argument that members 
would behave as if they computed sophisticated equivalents for each of 
the 2,097 ,151 nodes for the associated tree.1 The more serious point 
is that initial tests should be conducted on simple trees. 
9 
Finally, the theory of sophisticated voting depends heavily 
upon voters being able to "work up the agenda tree"--from the final 
vote to the initial vote. But in legislative settings of possible 
sophisticated voting, it is sometimes difficult to define the relevant 
"final vote. " For example, if such voting is on modifications of a 
section of a bill, is the "status quo" the present policy in the 
absence of any bill at all? (This is Enelow's (1981) assumption, for 
example. ) Or is it the policy stated in the bill as reported by the 
committee? Since most bills that reach the floor pass, a plausible 
argument can be made for the latter characterization: members think 
the bill will pass, thus at the final vote on an amendment to a 
section, the relevant reversion point may be that contained in the 
bill--not the true status quo level. In the final analysis, there is 
no clear advice for this problem other than the obvious point that 
judgment is required. 
In sum, our present purpose is not to solve all such problems 
associated with tests of voting strategies, but more modestly to draw 
attention to some institutionally important considerations. 
2 .  TESTING SOPHISTICATED VOTING MODELS 
Although anecdotal evidence exists that congressmen sometimes 
engage in sophisticated voting, the absence of a general method for 
testing sophisticated voting models has made it difficult to assess 
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the applicability of sophisticated voting models to congressional 
behavior. We will demonstrate that the theory of sophisticated voting 
and other formal theories of legislative behavior have testable 
implications, and we now propose an approach to empirical testing of 
such theories. The techniques are easily implemented and can 
potentially be applied to a wide variety of votes, even though the 
application in this paper is a relatively simple test of the sincere 
voting hypothesis. 
The most severe shortcoming of previous empirical work on 
sophisticated voting is that it relies heavily on ad hoc restrictions 
on members ' true preferences. That is, if it is possible to rule out 
certain voting patterns as inconsistent with any "true" preference 
ordering, then sincere voting can be tested by observing whether any 
of the inconsistent voting patterns occur. For example, consider 
voting on minimum wage legislation. If we assume that each 
congressman has a most preferred minimum wage level (including, 
possibly, no minimum wage ) and that utility functions are single­
peaked, then certain voting patterns are inconsistent with sincere 
voting. For instance, truthful reporting of preferences would not 
allow a member to vote for an amendment raising the minimum wage to a 
high level and also to vote for another amendment that reduces the 
minimum wage. With the assumption of single-peakedness it is possible 
to test for sophisticated behavior in a purely nonparametric way. 
But there are several drawbacks to such a procedure. First, 
suppose one or two congressmen violate the sincere voting requirement, 
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but all others vote in a way that is consistent with some allowable 
preference ordering. In some sense, such a violation is not very 
significant because at most two members could have engaged in 
sophisticated behavior, We would not want to perform a conventional 
test of significance here, however, since the rejection of the sincere 
voting model is not a statistical matter. Second, the technique is 
applicable to very few situations. In general, bills and amendments 
will differ on a wide variety of dimensions or , if the vote is 
believed to be on a' single dimension, it will be difficult to order 
the alternatives in a way that eliminates any possible voting 
patterns. (It is for this reason that so much of the empirical 
literature on sophisticated voting has an anecdotal flavor,) Finally, 
even if the sincere voting hypothesis is rejected, we lack any test of 
the sophisticated voting model. Rejecting the null hypothesis of 
sincere behavior does not allow us to "accept" the alternative of 
sophisticated behavior, since both models may be incorrect. We show 
below that with our technique it is possible to treat sophisticated 
voting as the null model and then to test is against a general 
(unspecified) alternative. 
Our approach relies on a parametric specification of 
legislators ' utility functions. This approach is now standard in 
econometrics (see McFadden, 1981) and provides a foundation for 
empirical work that is dir�ctly based upon individual utility 
maximization. Since a utility representation of preferences underlies 
almost all formal analyses of legislative institutions, the approach 
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is well suited to congressional roll call studies. For the 
sophisticated voting model, however, we modify the usual random 
utility se tup to accommodate lottery alternatives, To our knowledge, 
this extension is original, though Enelow (1981) has used an expected 
utility model to analyze sophisticated voting. The main modification 
required is that the utility representation chosen for preferences be 
of the von Neumann-Morgenstern form so that legislators are expected 
utility maximizers. 
Rather than develop models for a general agenda tree, for 
expository purposes we restrict ourselves to the simple case of a 
single amendment, illustrated in Figure 3. A bill (denoted s1 ) is 
being considered by the legislature, but a perfecting amendment, if 
offered, will have precedence and therefore is voted upon first. 
There are four possibilities (leading to three distinct outcomes) :  
the amendment may be  adopted and the amended bill (denoted s2 ) passes 
in a second vote; the amendment  is adopted but the amended bill fails 
in the second vote, resulting in the status quo (denoted s0) ;  the 
amendment fails and the unamended bill <s1) subsequently passes; or, 
the amendment fails and the unamended bill is also defeated, resulting 
again in the status quo (s0) , The probability that the amended bill 
passes in the second vote (given that the amendment is adopted in the 
first vote)  will be denoted by p, Similarly, the probability that the 
unamended bill passes in the second vote (given that the amendment 
passed in the first vote) is given by q, These probabilities are 
assumed to be common knowledge, i. e. each legislator has the same 
FIGURE 3 
ILLUSTRATION OF SiMPLE AMENDMENT PROCESS 
Vote on Amendment 
(s
2 vs. s1) 
Vote on Final Bill 
(s2 vs. so or sl 
vs. so) 
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estimate of the probabilities of the outcomes of the second round of 
voting. This, of course, is a strong assumption, but, in our view, a 
reasonable one for an initial pass at the data. Unfortunately, we (as 
legislative analysts or statisticians) do not know these 
probabilities, but it is possible to estimate them. 
Legislators are assumed to have von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility functions ui(•) defined over the possible states of the world: 
(1) 
If the amendment passes on the first vote, legislator i's 
expected utility is: 
(2) 
If the amendment fails on the first vote, his expected utility 
is: 
( 3) 
Legislators are assumed to vote for the outcome that results 
in the highest level of expected utility. Therefore, the condition 
under which legislator i will vote for the amendment in the first 
round of voting is: 
( 4) 
Contrast this condition to the one that would result if 
legislator i behaved "sincerely," i.e. voted for the proposal (either 
the amended bill or the unamended bill) that gave him the highest 
level of utility relative to the alternative against which it was 
posed. In this case, the condition for voting for the amendment in 
the first vote is 
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(5) 
because sincere voters, by definition, ignore the probable outcomes of 
successive votes. 
Utilities, of course, are unobservable, but ( 4) and (5) 
nevertheless provide a basis for an econometric test of the sincere 
and sophistica ted voting models. The utility of alternative j to 
legislator i depends on some measured characteristics of the 
legislator and the alternative, but these measured characteristics 
alone will not perfectly predict legislative choice since the 
legislator's utility function also depends on unmeasured 
characteristics of the bill or legislator. These unmeasured 
characteristics will, however, have a probability distribution. 
Therefore ui(sj) is a random variable and we may write: 
where zi is a vector of the legislator's characteristics, v(zi, sj) 
describes the representative or "strict" utility of state sj to a 
legislator with measured characteristics zi' and eij captures the 
effects of unmeasured characteristics of legislators or bills that 
(6) 
affect the legislator ' s  preferences. A reasonable assumption is that 
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eij's are independently normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance cr�, independent of zi. Then, under the assumption of 
sophisticated voting, the probability that legislator i votes for the 
amendment is: 
(7) 
where <I>(•) denotes the standardized normal distribution function. If 
a legislator votes sincerely, the probability that he or she votes for 
the amendment is: 
We have purposely left the form of v(•, •) unspecified since 
the argument does not depend on the nature or source of the 
legislator's preferences. However, the empirical content of the 
sincere and sophisticated voting theories is more apparent if 
( 8) 
v(•, •) is given some parametric form. In this paper, we consider the 
problem of estimating preferences over the minimum wage based on a 
series of roll call votes on proposals to set the minimum wage at 
various levels. In our analysis, we assume that each senator has a 
desired level of the minimum wage, denoted xi: 
where zi is a vector of state and senator specific characteristics 
( 9) 
(discussed later) , Senators are assumed to have quadratic utility 
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functions so that the strict utility of some minimum wage level 9j to 
a senator with ideal point xi is given by: 
(10) 
For two proposals, 9j and ek' it follows that: 
Substituting (9) into (10) yields: 
(11) 
Assuming random utilities are normally distributed, the probability 
senator i prefers the minimum wage 9j to 9k is (from ( 8)): 
(12) 
In (12) we have imposed a variance normalization and used the 
following notation: 
(13) 
and Ri is legislator is weak ordering over minimum wage levels. For a 
test of sincere voting, then, (12) can be estimated by probit 
analysis, Estimating the sophisticated voting model is somewhat more 
complicated, however. It is clear from (12) that with data on only 
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the initial vote, that the probabilities associa ted with the second 
vote are not identified. However, p can be consistently estimated by 
applying (12) to the final vote, and then the probabilities themselves 
could be estimated in a second step using the initial vote. 
This last point suggests a natural specification test for the 
sincere voting model, Under the null hypothesis of sincere voting, p 
can b& estimated by applying probit analysis to either the initial or 
final votes, Both estimates are consistent (and have the same 
probability limit) if voting is sincere, If voting is sophisticated, 
however, the two estimates of p will tend to different probability 
limits. In Appendix A we explain how a specification test can be 
constructed comparing the different estimates of p, In section 3 we 
apply this test to Senate roll call votes on minimum wage amendments 
in 1977. 
Whether voting is sincere or sophisticated, the procedure 
described above allows us to estimate legislator preferences on the 
minimum wage, In particular, the expected vote for 9j against Ok 
(under sincere voting) can be consistently estimated using: 
,.. a.s. 
provided P
n � p. This enables us to determine what strategies were 
available to legislators given the estimated configuration of 
preferences. The same technique applies for sophisticated voting, 
with sophisticated equivalents replacing the stated provisions of the 
bills. 
3. THE SENATE MINIMUM WAGE VOTES OF 1977 
18  
Congress first adopted a minimum wage of $.25 per hour in the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 193 8 and has periodically raised the 
mandated level as wage inflation has rendered the old minimum wage 
ineffective, Such was the case in 1977 when a newly elected 
Democratic president, prodded by his union supporters, proposed a $,20 
per hour increase to the 1977 minimum wage of $2.30 per hour. This 
increase was considerably less than labor's desired level of $3.00 per 
hour. Congress (and President Carter) eventually agreed to a more 
generous increase over four years (to $3.35 in 1981, where it remains 
today). 
The minimum wage amendments of 1977 provide an interesting 
application of our analytic techniques. The politics of the minimum 
wage are not well understood and the estimates we report below 
indicate some political subtleties that are frequently ignored in 
economic analyses of the minimum wage. The Senate minimum wage votes 
are also convenient since a series of roll call votes concerned a 
single dimension of choice: at what level should the minimum wage be 
set? Estimates of preferences on this dimension are easily 
interpretable as dollar amounts. Although the decision tree 
associated with the amendment process makes it difficult to 
distinguish sincere and sophisticated behavior, this application does 
illustrate the utility of our approach for answering other questions 
about legislative strategy, 
The debate on the minimum wage bill in 1977 involved old 
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arguments from both sides. Proponents argued that an increase was 
long overdue (the last increases were voted in 1974). At $2.30 per 
hour, the minimum wage would provide an annual income of only 
$4 ,SOO�below the poverty level for a family of four. By gradually 
raising the minimum wage to a point above the poverty line, they 
reasoned that poverty would be reduced. Opponents countered that 
raising the minimum wage does not necessarily raise anyone's wage, and 
that the more likely consequence would be to reduce employment. 
Conservatives' reasoning was that employers would lay off current 
workers, whose marginal revenue product would be less than the new 
mandated minimum--not by hiring persons currently unemployed (and 
especially not teenagers who have little or no labor market 
experience). In 1977 and other years, conservatives tried proposing a 
lower minimum wage for teenagers when it became apparent that their 
general arguments about the ill effects of the minimum wage would not 
prevail. 
The confusing part of this argument is not its content (which 
is little more than a textbook supply and demand analysis with price 
rationing), but rather who made it. Conservatives, not known for 
their concern about unemployment (teenage or otherwise), nevertheless 
based their arguments almost entirely on the bill's adverse effects on 
low wage workers and the unemployed. In the case of employment 
effects, conservatives clearly had the better of the argument. Simple 
economic logic, supported by countless empirical studies, demonstrates 
that the minimum wage reduces employment and hurts the employment 
prospects of the unemployed, Also uncharacteristically , liberals 
responded that the employment losses will be small and offset by the 
wage gains of employed workers. 
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Economists tend to dismiss the wage gains argument as another 
bit of political irrationality. Though it is possible, we think, to 
make an economically respectable argument for moderate increases in 
the minimum wage, 2 the standard economic analysis misses the essence 
of the political argument. The primary advocates of increasing the 
minimum wage are labor unions. Although unions tend to take liberal 
positions on poverty issues, on the minimum wage their preferences 
have a clear economic foundation. Had labor's proposal increase in 
1977 been enacted, it probably would have had the substantial 
disincentive effects on employment that conservatives warn about 
whenever any minimum wage increase is discussed, (Small to moderate 
size increases, such as that finally adopted in 1977, appear to have 
minimal employment effects. Some low wage workers may benefit for the 
reasons cited in footnote 2, but wage inflation means that the real 
minimum wage stays constant or even falls so that the constraint turns 
out to be non-binding for most workers soon after its adoption. ) The 
beneficiaries of a large increase in the minimum wage are workers 
already earning more than the proposed minimum, i.e. , workers who are 
likely to belong to labor unions. Labor's position in bargaining is 
strengthened because a higher minimum wage raises the labor costs of 
nonunionized employers. Employers also have incentives to shift from 
low skill workers (whose marginal product would be less that the 
minimum wage) to higher skilled workers who are more likely to be 
represented by labor unions. 
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Minimum wage increases are often supported by northern 
Republicans, perhaps because the degree of unionization in their 
states forces them to compete for union votes. Apart from 
unionization, northern states tend to have higher wage levels than 
southern and western states. Raising the minimum wage only raises 
wage rates in areas where the prevailing wage is near the minimum, By 
narrowing the gap in labor costs between northern and southern 
manufacturers, minimum wage increase can benefit northern states 
without having any direct effect upon their internal labor markets. 
This brief discussion has identified several factors that 
might lead legislators to favor or oppose an increase in the minimum 
wage. First, the standard economic analysis, which focuses on the 
employment effects of the minimum wage, would suggest that legislators 
representing areas with high unemployment would oppose raising the 
minimum wage. Second, a higher minimum wage makes firms in high wage 
areas more competitive with firms with lower labor costs and should be 
supported by congressmen from high wage states. Third, raising the 
minimum wage improves the bargaining position of unions and, 
therefore, should be supported by legislators from more unionized 
areas and by Democrats who rely more heavily than Republicans upon 
union support. Democrats may also favor the minimum wage for 
ideological reasons since it was one of the progressive reforms 
successfully implemented during the New Deal. 
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We use the model described in the previous section to analyze 
three Senate votes on the Fair Labor Standard Amendments of 1977 (S. 
1871) . The Human Resources Committee originally reported a bill 
containing indexing of the minimum wage, However the indexing 
provision was defeated earlier in the House and was strongly opposed 
by Senate moderates. Senators therefore expected amendments on the 
wage increase provision of the bill. Moreover, a complex unanimous 
consent agreement was reached that specified two of the alternative 
proposals (see Congressional Record, October 7, 1977, p, 32697). We 
refer to these according to their authors--Williams and Bartlett--and 
interpret the situation as one in which the formal agenda is known.3 
The sequence of events, shown in figure 4 ,  was as follows. 
First, the ranking members of the Committee, Senators Harrison 
A. Williams and Jacob K. Javits, proposed an amendment that replaced 
indexing by a four step minimum wage increase which, given current 
inflation forecasts, would have accomplished what indexing was 
intended to do. The Williams amendment would increase the minimum 
wage to $2.65 per hour in 1978, $2.90 in 1979, $3.15 in 1980, and 
$3.40 in 1981, (In retrospect, inflation far exceeded 1977 
expectations, so that indexing would have had rather different 
results. However, even critics of indexing, such as Senator John 
Tower who described the Williams amendment as "back-door indexing" 
which would "eliminate the formula, but keep the results, " did not 
foresee the inflationary spiral of the late seventies,) Indexing was 
effectively dead, so the practical alternatives were no minimum wage 
FIGURE 4 
AGENDA TREE FOR 1977 SENATE MINIMUM WAGE AMENDHENTS 
Status quo ($2.30) 
Williams amendment ($3.15) 
Tower amendment ($3.05, not offered if Bartlett passes) 
Bartlett amendment ($2.90) 
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bill or one with an sequence of specified minimum wage levels, 
Before a vote was taken on Williams, Republican Senator Dewey 
F. Bartlett offered an amendment to the Williams amendment that would 
have raised the minimum wage by $.20 per year from its 1977 level of 
$2.30 to $2. 90 by 1 980. The Senate defeated the Bartlett amendment 
72-17, Subsequently, Senator Tower proposed the same sequence of 
increases which the House had passed earlier (resulting in a $3.05 
minimum wage in 1980), but this amendment was also defeated (by 60-
32), After one additional vote (on an unprinted amendment) , the 
Senate then approved the Williams amendment by an overwhelming 76-14 
margin. 
We first estimate the sincere model for the three votes, using 
the 1 980 minimum wage level for the proposals ($3.15  for Williams, 
$3.05 for Tower, $2. 90 for Bartlett and $2.30 for the status quo) . 
Based on the previous discussions, each Senator's desired minimum wage 
is assumed to be a linear function of the unemployment rate in his 
state, the average hourly wage in the state's manufacturing sector, 
the percent of the labor force which is unionized, and the Senator's 
party (Democrats coded one, Republican zero) . Estimates of the 
sincere voting model for each of these votes are presented in Table 1 ,  
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TABLE 1 
ESTIMATES OF EQUATION (9) FROM 1977 SENATE MINIMUM WAGE VOTES 
Bartlett Tower Williams 
Constant 0.41 0.28 0.45 
(0. 1 8) (0.21) (0.23) 
Unemployment -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
Wage 0.22 0.20 0.25 
(0,20) (0,24) (0, 1 8) 
Union 0.06 0. 10 0.08 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Party 1.38 1.24 1.02 
(0, 41) (0.50) (0.37) 
log likelihood -25. 9 -32.8 -24.5 
Hausman statistic (X2) 5 9.83 7.51 
Number of observations 85 
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. The Hausman 
statistic compares the estimated coefficients for either the Bartlett 
or Tower amendments to those for the Williams amendment. 
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The estimates in Table 1 provide no evidence of 
misrepresentation of preferences on the preliminary roll calls. The 
probabilities associated with the Hausman statistics, fall below the 
.05 initial values for both the Bartlett and Tower votes. (See 
Appendix A for details of this calculation) All three sets of 
estimates confirm our skepticism about the role of unemployment 
considerations in determining legislators' preferences on the minimum 
wage. Although the unemployment coefficient is negative, in all three 
equations its magnitude is small and the estimate is insignificant. 
Average wage effects are consistently positive, but also 
insignificant. A one dollar increase in a state's average wage 
increases the. senator's desired minimum wage by approximately $.20. 
The union effect is much larger and highly significant. Others things 
being equal, a ten percent increase in the percentage of the workforce 
that is unionized, increases the desired minimum wage level by between 
$.60 and $1.00. The party effect is of a similar magnitude. 
Democrats prefer a minimum wage level between $1 .02 and $1 ,38 higher 
than Republicans. 
From each of these three equations, we estimated individual 
senator's ideal points and then the median desired minimum wage level 
among all 85 senators paired or voting on each amendment. The 
estimates of medians ranged from $3.29 to $3.57, indicating that the 
Williams proposal fell slightly below the median position. Using the 
method described in Appendix B, we found that minimum wage levels over 
the $4.00 level would be preferred by a majority of memb�rs to the 
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existing minimum wage of $2.30. This suggests that even though we 
cannot reject the hypothesis of sincere voting, from the broader 
standpoint of legislative strategy the 1977 minimum wage votes were 
not as uninteresting as they first appear, Although in some settings, 
sophisticated voting is a theoretically viable competing hypothesis to 
sincere voting, the formal agenda for the minimum wage decision (see 
Figure 4) makes it difficult to distinguish sincere and sophisticated 
behavior. Using the ideal points based on the estimates in Table 1 ,  
we computed the sophisticated equivalents for the agenda tree, and 
verified that in this situation the sincere and sophisticated outcomes 
were identical, Under either hypothesis (and taking the agenda as 
fixed) , the Williams amendment emerges as the winner. Thus failure to 
reject sincere voting does not automatically imply rejection of 
sophisticated voting. A convincing test would require analyzes of 
situations where the agendas have different sincere and sophisticated 
outcomes. 
The estimated ideal points are also useful for addressing 
questions about committee and amendment strategies. We estimated the 
median desired minimum wage (among the.SS senators paired or voting on 
each amendment) . Then, using the method described in Appendix B, we 
found that minimum wage levels of up to about $4.00 would have been 
preferred by a majority of Senators to the status quo wage of $2.30. 
Why then did the committee's ranking members not exploit the 
committee's proposal power more effectively, as models of agenda 
setting suggest they should? The most plausible explanation is 
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institutional, Senate floor procedures do not in general resemble the 
Romer and Rosenthal (1979) take-it-or-leave-it (closed rule) setting. 
Amendments can be and are proposed and attempts by committees to 
exploit their proposal power may induce amendments that bring about 
convergence to the median, as predicted, for example, by Black (1958) 
and Shepsle (1979). 
The more empirically plausible follow-up question is what the 
committee could have achieved in the actual setting which approximated 
an open rule. Whereas the estimated medians ranged form $3.29 to 
$3.57, it seems that Williams could have succeeded with a larger 
increase had he desired it. (Or so, too, could proponents have 
successfully amended Williams upward) , But the Williams am�ndment was 
not necessarily bad committee strategy for open rule settings. On the 
positive side, his amendment not only has the advantage of being 
certain to defeat the status quo, but also it left opponents of the 
minimum wage with only two undesirable amendment strategies, They 
could (and did) propose diluting amendments that were essentially 
destined to fail. Or alternatively (but awkwardly) they could propose 
"killer amendments" containing values of over $4.00, which, too, under 
sophisticated voting would have failed because moderates and liberals 
would have recognized them as such. 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The model estimated in section 3 and the test for sincere 
voting illustrate some possibilities for legislative roll call 
analysis. Sophisticated voting is a special case of what Shepsle 
(1979) has called a structure-induced equilibrium. That is, our 
assumption of a fixed agenda could produce an outcome different from 
that which would follow from a different sequence of binary majority 
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decisions. There are, of course, many other institutional features of 
Congress that determine how the preferences of individual congressmen 
are translated into legislative outcomes. Although formal analyses of 
institutional features at Congress are occasionally supported by 
anecdotal evidence, rarely are they subjected to serious empirical 
scrutiny. We indicate below how the basic methods described in 
section 2 can be used to test formal models of congressional behavior 
in a wide variety of situations, 
One problem of considerable interest is the gatekeeping power 
of committees. As before, let the utility function of legislator i 
with measured characteristics xi for state sj be given by: 
(14) 
Let (X,a) be the measure space of individual characteristics, µ be the 
distribution of characteristics within the chamber, and 
F(eij - eik l xi) be the conditional distribution of (eij - sik) given 
xi. The key determinant to oommittee behavior is the so-called win 
set W(s0) ,  consisting of bills that would defeat the status quo point, 
Because our formulation of utility is random, the win set is not 
deterministic, as in Shepsle's formulation. It is, however, possible 
to determine the probability that any particular bill will be passed 
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by the entire chamber: 
(15) 
Some simple calculations show that this probability is given by the 
integral: 
(16) 
It follows that the expected utility of the committee reporting bill 
sj to the floor for member i of the committee is given by: 
(17) 
This characterizes "sophisticated" behavior of committee members and 
is amenable to empirical analysis using the methods described in 
section 2. 
Of course, the example is a simplified rendering of the 
institutional arrangements facing congressmen, It does, however, 
clearly illustrate the empirical strategies that are applicable to 
congressional decision-making problems. Some additional areas for 
which theories recently have been developed but empirical t,ests have 
been limited or nonexistent include: why committees seldom get 
"rolled" on the floor even under open rules (Shepsle and Weingast, 
1 985), how jurisdictionally-induced logrolls are created and sustained 
(Ferejohn, 1 985), why and when congressmen prefer and vote for strict 
applications of the new budget process (Ferejohn and Krehbiel, 1985), 
how "sophisticated committees" go about drafting bills to secure 
passage on the floor (Denzau and Mackay, 1 983), and how committees 
negotiate with the Rules Committee for consideration of such 
legislation on the floor under favorable conditions (Shepsle, 1 985). 
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Needless to say, this is an ambitious research program, but 
the empirical example in section 3 gives us some encouragement about 
its feasibility, Subsequent work will be devoted to multidimensional 
choice problems where the dimensions are not so easily interpreted as 
in the case of minimum wage legislation, Estimation of complex models 
in such situations makes heavy demands on the data so success is 
hardly assured, While we have yet to devise tests for all of the 
legislative processes mentioned above, we hope to have demonstrated 
that formal theories of congressional behavior are not fundamentally 
untestable. 
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APPENDIX A 
TESTING FOR SINCERE VOTING 
Under the sincere voting model, we observe two random 
variables (the initial and final votes) whose distribution, under the 
null hypothesis of sincere voting, depends on the same parameter 
vector p. Since we have two estimators of this parameter (by 
estimating the choice model separately for each vote), this suggests a 
natural Hausman (1978) test comparing the two estimates. 
setting. 
We develop the test procedure in a slightly more general 
Suppose Y1i and y2i have distributions conditional on zi, 
F1(y1ilzi, p) and F2(y2ilzi, p), respectively, and that the Stieltjes 
measures generated by F1(·) and F2(•) are absolutely continuous with 
respect to a a-finite measure �. The parameter vector p is assumed to 
belong a compact subset B of finite-dimensional Euclidean space. Let 
f1 = dF1/d� and f 2 = dF2/d� denote the Radon-Nikodym derivatives of F1 
and F2, With a random sample of size n, the maximum likelihood 
estimators t1n and �2n of p solve the following optimization problems : 
n 
max �1 log f1Cy11lzi;JJ) B (Al) 
n 
max [ log f2(y211zi;p) 
B i=l 
(A2) 
Subject to some regularity conditions, both t1n and p2n converge to 
• • 
values p1 and p2, respectively (both assumed to lie in the interior of 
• 
B) , as n � ro, In the terminology of Gourieroux et. al, ,  (1983), p1 
• and p2 are referred to as "pseudo true values." If the model is 
correctly specified (e. g. , under the null hypothesis of sincere 
• • 0 voting) then p1 = p2 = p (say), so we have : 
� a. � • .,o 
"ln ., " 
,,_ a. s. 0 
J:l2n � P 
Thus, under the null hypothesis (of correct specification) 
a. s. 
� 0 
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(A3) 
(A4) 
(AS) 
The Hausman test compares qn to zero, To compute a test statistic, we 
need the asymptotic covariance matrix of qn• i.e. a sequence of 
matrices Vn such that : 
(A6) 
In this appendix we show that : 
(A7) 
satisfies the condition, provided plim q = o, whether or not the 
n�"' n 
model is correctly specified, where: 
We sketch the proof, 
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Lemm...J!: Under the regularity assumptions of Gourieroux, Monfort, and 
Trognon (1984), 
A 
n a log fl (y1tlzt1ll1n> 
n-1/2 
b1 a111 D 
A � N(O,V) 
t1 
a log fz<Y2tlzt:ll2n> 
a112 
(AS) 
where 
ff " 
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where G� denotes the (true) conditional distributions of yji given zi 
and G� the (true) joint distributions of Yli and Yzi given zi' 
Proof: Follows from a Taylor series argument similar to White (1982) 
or Gouieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984). 
Proposition: Under the null hypothesis of sincere voting: 
were [•) denotes any generalized inverse and p = rank V. 
(A9) 
Proof: Follows from the preceding lemma and Jennrich's uniform strong 
law (see Rivers and Vuong, 1985, Theorem 2.9), 
The test statistic in (A9) is reported in section 3 of the 
paper to test the sincere voting hypothesis. 
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APPENDIX B 
ESTIMATING HYPOTHETICAL VOTE OUTCOMES 
The models described in this paper posit that the probability 
a legislator with measured characteristics zi votes for some bill 0j 
over 0k is given by a known function F(zi;p
0, ej, 0k) which is 
crz-measurable for each combination of the last three arguments and 
continuous in the last three arguments for µ-almost all zi. The true 
value of the parameters po is unknown, but we have a consistent 
estimator � • The problem described in the text is to estimate the n 
expected vote for 0j over 0k: 
(Bl) 
Let Hn(z) denote the empirical distribution function of z. With the 
assumption of random sampling, the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem ensures 
that for any E a az: 
a.s 
µ(E) (B2) 
By the Helly-Bray lemma: 
and the function of the right is continuous in p, It follows that the 
expected vote for 0j over 0k is consistently estimated by: 
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as n � "'• 
This result enables us to determine sophisticated equivalents, 
win sets and other useful information. For example, the win set of a 
proposal 00 is defined by: 
(B3) 
The win set W(00) can be estimated by: 
(0: (1/n) 
(For the case of scalar 0 and single peaked preferences, W(00) will be 
a finite interval of the real line, ) Further, it can demonstrated 
that with probability one: 
which is a set consistency concept. 
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FOOTNOTES 
• We would like to thank Kim Border, Jeff Dubin, and Quang Vuong for 
helpful comments and advice. 
1 ,  For an amendment tree with n votes, the number of nodes in the 
associated decision tree is [ �=�2 k. 
2. For example, if employers incur training coats that increase the 
worker's firm-specific human capital, wage contracts rates will 
not reflect worker's marginal productivity. Raising the minimum 
wage to any level that does not exceed the worker's marginal 
revenue product will result in wage gains for that worker rather 
than dismissal. In this situation, training gives the firm a 
monopoly over demand for the employee's labor. 
3. We also analyze a third vote on an amendment proposed by Senator 
Tower, even though it was not included in the UCA. We show below 
that even if the amendment was unanticipated, it could not have 
affected strategic calculations. 
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